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13 June 1946

COPY NO. 41STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Stone, Department of State,
Steering Member (S-3215)Colonel Dana W. Johnson, War Department
(W-73022)Captain H. R. Thurber, USN, Navy Department
(N-2439)Subject: Appointment of an ad hoc Committee.

1. By informal action on 10 June 1946 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee agreed to appoint an ad hoc Committee to study and report on SWNCC 304, copy of which is enclosed.*
2. The above-named individuals have been designated by their respective departments to serve on this ad hoc Committee.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

 Secretary

25X1

* Furnished above-named individuals only.

*1 copy in Advisory Council
1 copy in Central Records*

JCS, ARMY, NAVY and NSC review(s) completed.

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S E C R E T

COPY NO. 65

SWNCC 304

4 June 1946

Pages 1 - 2, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum by the Acting Navy Member, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

HAROLD W. MOXELEY

Secretariat

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SWNCC 304

A True Copy

John F. Killea

E N C L O S U R E

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air

1. The United States had a gratifying measure of success during World War II in assisting military operations by means of psychological warfare. Time, fortunately, was available at the beginning of the war to make plans for psychological warfare, and to integrate them with military operations. Success came only after protracted, extensive studies of the subject, and resultant trial-and-error methods. Coordinated staff studies to increase the effectiveness of psychological warfare, particularly with respect to better coordination in military theaters, were canceled when Japan surrendered.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are now undertaking an analytical history of U. S. psychological warfare which will be completed in about one year. There are at present a number of reports and records in the State, War and Navy Departments on psychological warfare during World War II. These, in combination with CCS, JCS, JPS and other official papers on the subject and the present availability in Washington of a number of civilian and military personnel who participated in World War II efforts, form an invaluable reservoir of knowledge with respect to the earlier phases and subsequent problems involved in plans, coordination, implementation and techniques. Personnel available also are cognizant of the successes and failures registered.

3. I am of the opinion that with this number of experienced personnel and with ample source material on which to draw, we should proceed now with an analytical study of U.S. psychological warfare in World War II with a view toward keeping this weapon in a state of coordinated readiness for future wartime employment. Additional data, such as that which undoubtedly will be contained in the Joint Chiefs

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of Staff history, can be evaluated later upon completion of this comprehensive study.

4. It is recommended that an ad hoc committee be appointed by SWNCC to study and report on the future status of psychological warfare. As an approach to the committee's problem, I consider it may be assumed that future national psychological warfare effort will continue under non-military control, and that integration of the national effort with military plans will be requisite so as to assist and not to interfere with those plans. With this assumption, it is proposed that the committee be directed to review World War II efforts in psychological warfare, and recommend:

- a. A peacetime organization for keeping psychological warfare in a ready-for-mobilization status;
- b. A wartime psychological warfare organization; both organizations to be assigned such directives as will insure effective planning, coordination and implementation, particularly with respect to the integration of national psychological warfare with military plans.

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2 CAD 5
3 1 D of I G-2, WDGS
5 1,2,3 Concurrence

4 4 or comment Col Johnston/73022

Establishment of Psychological Warfare
MID 912 Division, Special Staff 22 May 1946

SUMMARY

1. The attached memorandum for the Chief of Staff, subject as above, sets forth the desirability of establishing a Psychological Warfare Division as a component of the WDSS.
2. The memorandum emphasizes the following points:
 - a. War Department responsibility for psychological warfare has been the function of Propaganda Branch, G-2, WDGS, since its establishment in November, 1943.
 - b. Prior to that date there existed a number of military and quasi-military organizations conducting psychological warfare planning and operations, with divided authority and consequent reduced efficiency.
 - c. Psychological warfare is not a new weapon, yet no firm determination of its role in the military establishment had been made at the outbreak of World War II, and civilian agencies were therefore called upon to perform a military function.
 - d. Since psychological warfare is certain to play an increased role in any future conflict, its place within the War Department should be established.
 - e. While relying on intelligence during wartime, psychological warfare is primarily operational in nature and does not fall readily within the scope of the Intelligence Division. However, the diverse nature of its activities is such that it does not appear to be a logical responsibility of OPD.
 - f. Field experience in World War II proved that psychological warfare is best conducted by a division or branch of Special Staff status. Such a division would insure complete exploitation of the potentials of psychological warfare and would provide for the study of existing methods and the development of improved techniques leading towards the most effective utilization of the weapon.
 - g. The establishment of a psychological warfare division on a Special Staff level would obviate the necessity of forcing commanders in the field to have civilian agencies thrust upon them for the conduct of military psychological warfare within their theaters. It would provide a central organization within the War Department for the planning and conduct of all phases of psychological warfare.

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3. Recommended that Psychological Warfare Division, WDSS, be established with functions and responsibilities as set forth in Appendix A.

COORDINATION

Concur - D of 1 ()
CAD ()
OPD ()
G-3 ()

1 Enclosure

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff,
2/attachments.

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
DIV. G-2
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

MID 912

22 May 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Establishment of Psychological Warfare Division,
Special Staff

DISCUSSION

1. Psychological warfare problems of interest to the War Department have been the responsibility of the Propaganda Branch, G-2, WDGS, acting under the direct control of the A. C. of S., G-2, in accordance with instructions of the Deputy Chief of Staff. (Tab A) Under the provisions of JCS, 224 Series, the Chief, Propaganda Branch also acts as the Army Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison with the Overseas Planning Board, Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, Department of State. The Propaganda Branch also provides for AAF interest in psychological warfare in accordance with the decision of the D. C. of S. abolishing the AAF Psychological Warfare Service and transferring its personnel to the Propaganda Branch. (Tab B)

2. Prior to the establishment of the Propaganda Branch, psychological warfare problems were the responsibility of the following staff agencies:

World War I - Psychologic Subsection, M.I. 2, Military Intelligence Division

1919-1941	- None
1941	- Special Studies Group - OASW and A. C. of S., G-2
1942	- Psychological Warfare Branch, MIS
1943	- OPD Policy Section, Strategy and Policy Group

A brief summary of War Department participation in psychological warfare is attached as Tab C.

3. Although propaganda leaflets were employed by the Continental Forces in action against British troops at the Battle of Bunker Hill in 1775, and, in more modern times, an extensive propaganda effort was developed in World War I, yet no firm doctrine or determination of the proper role of psychological warfare in the military establishment had been developed by the War Department at the outbreak of World War II. As a result, civilian agencies were to a large extent relied upon to plan, develop and execute psychological warfare missions for the armed forces. Under Executive Order 9312, the Office of War Information was assigned responsibility for planning, development and execution of all

phases of the federal program of radio, press, publications, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information, except in Latin America, which was assigned to the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Programs of foreign propaganda in the theaters of operations were subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while those parts executed in theaters of military operations were subject to the control of the theater commander.

4. As a result, psychological warfare operations in the various theaters were to a large extent concerned with the integration and utilization of civilians who had been hastily trained and selected for this work by the OWI. In the absence of War Department doctrine or policy, various arrangements and agreements were made by the theater commanders concerning the degree of such utilization. In some theaters, notably SWPA, very little use was made of OWI civilians in the field, while in other areas, particularly those under SHAEF Control, extensive use was made in all operations, both strategic and tactical.

5. By military order of the Commander in Chief, dated 13 June 1942, as amended by Presidential Executive Order of 9 March 1943, the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) was established as an operating agency of the Government under the direction and supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was assigned the mission of conducting secret operations within enemy countries and enemy-occupied or controlled countries for the purpose of executing morale subversion by means of covert or "black" propaganda, including false rumors, "freedom stations", false leaflets and false documents for undermining the morale of the enemy. Although OSS was organized as a military structure it did not have recognized status as an agency of the War Department, with a result that theater commanders were often reluctant to utilize its services. As a result, OSS operated only to a very limited extent in the Cincpac-Cincpoa area, and not at all in the SWPA.

6. Should this nation ever have to face another world war, the greater totality which will undoubtedly characterize it will apply to the psychological as well as to the material means with which it is fought. In a contest in which the material forces were closely balanced, victory might well hinge upon our capacity to shake the determination of our enemies and to win the support of people very different from ourselves. Therefore, the War Department cannot afford to neglect the implementation of any means which would assist in the accomplishment of such objectives, and with the reorganization of the War Department, it appears pertinent to re-examine the status of psychological warfare within the General Staff.

7. Psychological Warfare cannot be improvised. Rather it requires a continuous accumulation of pertinent facts, many of them of a technical nature, and a discerning evaluation of such facts by trained specialists, capable of following intently all developments in the field of mass education and mass information, as well as political and psychological techniques. Such studies, while relying to a certain extent on intelligence sources, are not properly within the role of military intelligence,

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which is devoted principally to an estimate of the war-making capabilities of other nations. The need for such a group within the War Department has been recognized by the Army member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, who in a letter dated 22 December 1945, to the A. C. of S., OPD, stressed the importance of consolidating the lessons learned in World War II and establishing a small Psychological Warfare Branch in the War Department. (Tab D) This same need has also been recognized in the official reports of psychological warfare activities in all theaters of operations.

8. Field experience during World War II demonstrated that while psychological warfare was originally assigned to the various G-2 staff sections for development and implementation, the diverse character of the operations were such that the establishment of special staff sections was necessitated. As a result, in ETO, MTO, SWPA, and eventually in POA, Psychological Warfare Divisions or Branches were established and psychological warfare was recognized as an auxiliary operational weapon.

9. To insure complete exploitation of the potentials of psychological warfare, studies of a highly technical character must be vigorously pursued. These studies should include the development and utilization of airborne, rocket, and artillery propaganda-dispensing devices, public address systems, both air and ground types, and specialized morale deterioration devices. In addition, all technical improvements in such diverse fields as radio and television, printing and publishing, and motion pictures will require constant study and review. Furthermore, there must be sufficient experimentation in and development of such items to enable standardization and the establishment of approved tables of equipment and channels of supply.

10. Analysis of the responsibilities of the Intelligence Division indicates that it is particularly concerned with the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence and with security of information. Although relying on intelligence for propaganda purposes during wartime, psychological warfare is an operational function involving not only military intelligence, but strategic developments, political forces, historic and ethnic backgrounds of people, and diplomacy on the highest level. However, the diverse and technical character of its operations and responsibilities does not appear to be a logical responsibility of the Operations Division.

11. In the event of a future emergency, while overall political and psychological warfare policies will stem from the White House and the State Department, the existence of a nuclear organization within the War Department possessing a complete plan for military psychological warfare and the technical means of implementation, would avoid the situation of World War II wherein theater commanders had thrust upon them civilian agencies to conduct military psychological warfare within their theaters, with resultant conflict of authority and lack of control over training standards and performance. Furthermore, a psychological warfare organization on the Special Staff level would

also be capable of planning, executing and implementing subversive morale operations, thus providing a unified structure within the War Department for the conduct of all phases of psychological warfare.

ACTION RECOMMENDED

It is recommended that the Psychological Warfare Division, War Department Special Staff, be established with responsibilities and functions substantially as outlined in APPENDIX A.

CONCURRENCES

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CAD	()
OPD	()
G-3	()

5 Incls

1. Appendix A
2. Tab A. MID Memo No. 78
3. Tab B. Memo for the D. C. of S.
4. Tab C. Brief of WD participation in P. W.
5. Tab D. Letter from Maj. Gen. Lemnitzer

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ORGANIZATION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION

RESPONSIBILITY. The Director, Psychological Warfare Division, War Department Special Staff is responsible for staff functions which relate to War Department participation in psychological warfare, for the research, development and military application of new or improved techniques or devices in the sphere of psychological warfare. In addition he acts as the Army member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison with the Department of State for psychological warfare matters. The Psychological Warfare Division will:

1. Advise the Chief of Staff on all psychological warfare matters of interest to the War Department.
2. Establish policies for and coordinate psychological warfare matters for the War Department.
3. Develop plans and policies governing Army participation in psychological warfare, including morale operations.
4. Plan and direct analysis of psychological warfare operations against or affecting the military interests of the U. S. whether of foreign or domestic origin.
5. Review long-range informational and educational materials furnished to United States Forces insofar as these may concern the psychological or political characteristics of foreign peoples, or may themselves constitute statements of national policy.
6. Formulate plans, studies, and directives for military participation in propaganda and psychological warfare operations involving the other nations of the world.
7. Coordinate the preparation of training aids and literature on psychological warfare for training programs of military psychological warfare units.
8. Maintain War Department liaison with major commands, staffs, agencies, and services on psychological warfare matters.
9. Collect and disseminate technical data on psychological warfare devices.
10. Formulate training doctrine and coordinate training programs for military psychological warfare units.

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11. Establish policies for and coordinate research in and development of psychological warfare technical devices.
12. Furnish War Department representation with other governmental activities concerned in psychological warfare matters.

ORGANIZATION. The subdivisions of the Psychological Warfare Division and their functions are:

1. OPERATIONS BRANCH:

- a. Maintains liaison with the Overseas Planning Board of the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, Navy Department and other interested agencies of the government with respect to propaganda and psychological warfare matters.
- b. Reviews the Federal program of foreign public information and prepares periodic studies of same.
- c. Prepares psychological warfare materials for use by disseminating agencies.
- d. Reviews incoming intelligence materials for items of psychological warfare interest.
- e. Maintains War Department liaison with major commands, agencies and services on psychological warfare matters.
- f. Furnishes War Department representation with other governmental activities concerned with psychological warfare.
- g. Handles all administrative details, correspondence, and personnel matters of the Psychological Warfare Division.

2. PLANS AND POLICY BRANCH.

- a. Establishes policies for and coordinates psychological warfare matters for the War Department.
- b. Develops plans and policies governing War Department participation in the national psychological warfare effort, including morale operations.
- c. Reviews long-range educational and informational materials furnished to United States Forces insofar as these may concern the psychological or political characteristics of foreign peoples or may themselves constitute statements of national policy.
- d. Formulates plans, studies and directives for military participation in psychological warfare operations involving other nations of the

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world in anticipation of future requirements.

e. Develops projects for execution in conjunction with other agencies of the government in order to influence public opinion in foreign countries; to counteract hostile military psychological warfare and to further the military policy of the United States.

3. TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES BRANCH.

a. Formulates psychological warfare training doctrine and coordinates training programs for military psychological warfare units.

b. Develops and coordinates the preparation of training aids and literature on psychological warfare tactics and techniques for use in the training programs of military service schools and higher staff colleges.

c. Establishes policies for and coordinates the research in and development of psychological warfare technical devices, with special reference to dissemination of psychological warfare materials by leaflet, bomb, guided missile, artillery shell, public address systems.

d. Collects and disseminates technical data on psychological warfare operations.

4. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH.

a. Plans and directs the analysis of psychological warfare operations affecting the military interests of the United States, whether of foreign or domestic origin, and issues periodic studies of the same.

b. Prepares special studies on the psychological vulnerabilities and attitudes of other nations of the world.

c. Cooperates with and assists other agencies of the government, quasi-official and private organizations engaged in psychological research in the techniques of gauging and influencing public opinion.

d. Plans and supervises the compilation of historical data on psychological warfare to include a critical evaluation of U. S. Government psychological warfare operations during World War II.

BY DIRECTION OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

Attachment:


Outline Organization Chart.

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OUTLINE OF ORGANIZATION, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
DIVISION

4 Pages
Page 4.



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